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BOOK REVIEW
The New Legal Liberalism
Emma Kaufman†
The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court,
and the Battle for the American Mind
Justin Driver. Pantheon, 2018. 576 pages.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, legal academics have mounted
a sustained attack on the traditional liberal idea that judges protect minority rights against majority will. Historians have challenged the notion that courts are countermajoritarian heroes.1 Political scientists have argued that court rulings reflect popular
sentiment, following rather than leading social change.2 Constitutional theorists have criticized judicial supremacy3 and fretted
about backlash against unpopular decisions.4 Philosophers have

† Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School. For
helpful conversations and feedback, I am grateful to Will Baude, Emily Buss, Travis Crum,
Justin Driver, William Hubbard, Lucy Kaufman, Brian Leiter, Jonathan Masur, Wendy
Moffat, John Rappaport, David Strauss, Laura Weinrib, and the editors of The University
of Chicago Law Review.
1
Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw U L Rev
145, 192 (1998). See also Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History,
126 Harv L Rev 2312, 2320 (2013) (describing a “new civil rights history” that deemphasizes courts); Lucas A. Powe Jr, The Warren Court and American Politics 490 (Belknap
2000) (challenging the countermajoritarian account of the Warren Court). See also generally Corinna B. Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U Pa L Rev 1361 (2004).
2
See, for example, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? 40 (Chicago 2d ed 2008). Constitutional theorists have made similar arguments. See, for example, Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 303 (Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux 2009).
3
See generally, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford 2004).
4
For a summary of backlash scholarship, see generally Robert C. Post and Reva B.
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv CR–CL L Rev 373
(2007). See also note 80.
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advanced a strong case against judicial review.5 Feminists and
critical race theorists have exposed courts’ role in reproducing inequality.6 The cumulative result of this scholarship is a legal
academy that is deeply skeptical about the judiciary’s capacity
and willingness to protect disfavored groups.7
Against this backdrop, Professor Justin Driver has written a
book to give us hope. Technically, The Schoolhouse Gate is an account of constitutional rights in American public schools. But this
Review argues that the book has a bigger ambition: to restore
faith in federal courts. Every generation of legal scholars writes
in response to its forebears. Critics of the judiciary reacted to a
mode of scholarship they found too court-focused, too doctrinal,
and insufficiently attuned to social movements.8 Driver, in turn,
challenges the turn away from courts, arguing that scholars have
dramatically underestimated the judiciary’s countermajoritarian
capacities. This is a refreshing, inspiring, and—given the state of
the legal academy—downright audacious idea.
This Review examines the significance of Driver’s argument
and urges constitutional scholars to grapple with its implications.
Part I recounts the book’s central claims and seeks to reconcile
The Schoolhouse Gate with Driver’s earlier work critiquing the
Warren Court.
Part II argues that the book represents the resurgence of legal
liberalism, a form of scholarship that has gone missing from the
legal academy. This Part takes on the task of defining liberalism,
a notoriously fluid concept, and explores why liberal theories of the
judiciary went out of fashion in the late 1980s. In reconstructing
this history, Part II aims to contribute to the small but essential
body of writing on movements in legal thought.9 In 1981, Professor
5
See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L J
1346, 1369–76 (2006). But see Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 121 Harv L Rev 1693, 1694–1701 (2008).
6
See, for example, Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and
the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform 130 (Oxford 2004); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv CR–CL L Rev 323, 341 (1987).
Part II provides a fuller account of each of these movements.
7
Professor Justin Driver calls this “the Age of Judicial Skepticism,” while Professor
Frank Michelman refers to it as the emergence of a “counterconstitutional mainstream.”
Justin Driver, Reactionary Rhetoric and Liberal Legal Academia, 123 Yale L J 2616, 2621
(2014); Frank I. Michelman, Why Not Just Say No? An Essay on the Obduracy of Constitution
Fixation, 94 BU L Rev 1141, 1148 (2014).
8
See Part II.
9
For a few examples, see Goluboff, 126 Harv L Rev at 2318–27 (cited in note 1)
(discussing “the new civil rights history”); Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, Changing the
Wind: Notes toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L J 2740,
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Owen Fiss observed that “law, as opposed to history, is lacking a
literature on its scholarship.”10 Although this is less true today,
writing and thinking about how we write—a practice one might
call “lexiography”—remains less common in law than in other academic fields. Part II examines why legal scholars lost confidence
in federal courts and how their scholarship changed as a result.
Part III considers whether Driver’s theory of the judiciary,
which I describe as the new legal liberalism,11 would be possible
in a book about a different domain of constitutional law. Drawing
on examples from prison and immigration law, this Part argues
that the schoolhouse is an unusually hopeful—and in that sense
exceptional—venue for a study of federal courts. This does not
mean that Driver’s optimism is misplaced. But it does mean that,
to fully realize his vision, courts will have to make less hospitable
corners of constitutional doctrine look more like the law that
emerges when “the Constitution goes to school.”12
I. FAITH IN FEDERAL COURTS
The Schoolhouse Gate is a sweeping examination of schoolchildren’s constitutional rights. Professor Driver begins his story
at the turn of the twentieth century, when a unanimous Supreme
Court upheld a southern school board’s decision to eliminate the
only public high school for black students.13 That decision left
black children in Augusta, Georgia without a four-year public
high school for another half century and inaugurated an era in
which courts declined to regulate even “blatant racial inequality”
in public schools (p 33).
Driver takes his readers from that era, through the Warren
Court, to the present. This quick summary does injustice to the
care and breadth of his account, which covers everything from

2746–49 (2014) (describing trends in legal scholarship in the second half of the twentieth
century). See also generally David Kennedy and William W. Fisher III, eds, The Canon of
American Legal Thought (Princeton 2006); Robin West, Normative Jurisprudence: An Introduction (Cambridge 2011). Historians including Professor Laura Kalman have also contributed to the construction of a legal historiography. See generally Laura Kalman, The
Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (Yale 1996); Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale
1927–1960 (North Carolina 1986).
10 Owen M. Fiss, The Varieties of Positivism, 90 Yale L J 1007, 1016 (1981).
11 See generally Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale (cited in note 9). Thanks to Driver
for suggesting Kalman’s work and, by extension, the title of this piece.
12 Driver teaches a course with this title at the University of Chicago (p 432).
13 See Cumming v County Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 US 528,
545 (1899).
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early efforts to restrict private education14 to midcentury debates
about the pledge of allegiance15 and current controversies over
cyberbullying,16 school prayer,17 and transgender students’ access
to bathrooms.18 But this sketch of The Schoolhouse Gate does capture the book’s arc, which will be familiar to civil rights scholars:
a long period of hands-off jurisprudence, followed by the halcyon
days of the 1960s, and then the slow ebb of civil rights as courts
cabined the major achievements of the Warren Court.
Driver’s book is not, however, a chronology, nor is it the traditional story of civil rights in retreat.19 The Schoolhouse Gate is
organized thematically around speech, religion, discipline, policing,
racial segregation, and inequality “beyond the racial context”—a
category that includes cases on funding disparities, sex segregation, and unauthorized immigrants’ access to schools (p 315). In
each chapter, Driver recounts the Supreme Court cases that
shaped the meaning of students’ constitutional rights.
Sometimes this means revisiting landmark precedents like
Pierce v Society of Sisters20 and Tinker v Des Moines Independent
Community School District.21 Other times, it means introducing
readers to cases that are less famous, at least to those outside
education law. Lum v Rice,22 which upheld a Mississippi school
board’s decision to assign Chinese-American students to black rather than white segregated schools,23 and Ingraham v Wright,24
which rejected a due process challenge to corporal punishment,25
14 See Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534–35 (1925) (invalidating an Oregon
statute that prohibited private and home schooling).
15 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag violated the First Amendment).
16 See p 138 (discussing whether students’ online activity, including cyberbullying,
falls “within the purview of school disciplinarians”).
17 See p 393 (exploring the persistence of school prayer).
18 For one prominent example in this ongoing debate, see G.G. v Gloucester County
School Board, 822 F3d 709, 715 (4th Cir 2016), vacd and remd, Gloucester County School
Board v G.G., 137 S Ct 1239 (2017) (reversing the dismissal of a Title IX challenge to a
local school board policy that prevented transgender students from using “restrooms congruent with their gender identity”).
19 See, for example, Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making
and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons 46 (Cambridge 1998)
(describing the period since 1986 as “the reform movement in retreat”).
20 268 US 510 (1925).
21 393 US 503 (1969) (articulating the governing standard for students’ free speech
claims).
22 275 US 78 (1927).
23 Id at 87.
24 430 US 651 (1977).
25 Id at 683.
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fall into the latter category. The Schoolhouse Gate is at its best
when analyzing these unfamiliar cases, for they reveal Driver’s
true aim. This book is an act of canon creation—less a comprehensive history than a concerted effort to define and valorize the
field of constitutional education law. Driver is not shy about this
goal: he calls the public school “the single most significant site of
constitutional interpretation within the nation’s history” and
makes a powerful case for that claim (p 9).
Nor is Driver timid about race, a topic that gets airtime in every
chapter. As it must, The Schoolhouse Gate includes an extended
discussion of Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,26 a case
whose “mythic status” is at once deserved and lamented by scholars
who seek a more nuanced history of civil rights27 (p 251). But
Brown is not the only race case in this canon. For Driver, Goss v
Lopez,28 which afforded students limited procedural protections
before a suspension,29 is a case about race notwithstanding the dissenters’ efforts to “sanitize [it] of its racial dimensions” (p 157). So
too are cases on school searches,30 vouchers,31 single-sex schools,32
uniforms,33 and dress codes.34 This book’s subtle but significant
achievement is to foreground the role that race plays in nearly
every decision about how to constitute and regulate American
public schools.

26

347 US 483 (1954).
See, for example, Goluboff, 126 Harv L Rev at 2320 (cited in note 1) (describing
historians’ efforts to decenter Brown); Randall L. Kennedy, Ackerman’s Brown, 123 Yale
L J 3064, 3069–71 (2014) (critiquing the lionization of Brown).
28 419 US 565 (1975).
29 Id at 579.
30 See, for example, New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325, 341–42 (1985) (adopting a reasonable suspicion standard for school searches).
31 See, for example, Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 662–63 (2002) (rejecting
an Establishment Clause challenge to Cleveland, Ohio’s school voucher program).
32 See, for example, A.N.A. v Breckinridge County Board of Education, 833 F Supp
2d 673, 678 (WD Ky 2011) (“The Supreme Court has never held that separating students
by sex in a public school—unlike separating students by race . . . is per se unconstitutional.”). See also Vorchheimer v School District of Philadelphia, 532 F2d 880, 888 (3d Cir
1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430 US 703 (1977) (rejecting an Equal Protection
challenge to Philadelphia’s system of optional, sex-segregated public high schools).
33 See, for example, Littlefield v Forney Independent School District, 268 F3d 275,
291 (5th Cir 2001) (rejecting First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to a Texas
school district’s mandatory uniform policy).
34 See, for example, Defoe v Spiva, 625 F3d 324, 329, 338 (6th Cir 2010) (upholding
a dress code in Anderson County, Tennessee that prohibited a student from wearing a tshirt “bearing an image of the Confederate flag”).
27
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In this respect, although it contains a full chapter on racial
segregation, The Schoolhouse Gate dislodges Brown from the center of debates over race and education. Those debates tend to start
with segregation and end with affirmative action—that is, to focus on who goes to which school. The Schoolhouse Gate examines
the contested politics of school assignment but suggests that
achieving racial equality will mean something more than getting
the numbers right. As Driver sees it, the “march toward racial
equality” (p 157) also requires conversations about drug testing,
strip searching, vouchers, paddling, and prayer, to name just a
few of the charged issues that surface in classrooms across the
country. Driver’s views on these topics are diverse and sometimes
unexpected; one never gets the sense that he hews to the party
line. Driver does not, for instance, endorse Establishment Clause
challenges to voucher programs,35 and he believes that in some cases
the First Amendment protects students’ choice to wear Confederate
flags.36 This variation is precisely his point: if we paid more attention to race in education cases, and thereby expanded the canon
of “race cases” beyond Brown and its progeny, we would have
richer debates about both race and education.
This claim will not surprise anyone who has read Driver’s
previous writing on race. The Schoolhouse Gate continues the line
of work Driver began in Recognizing Race,37 in which he argued
that courts engage in “asymmetrical racial recognition,” overemphasizing racial stereotypes in some cases and ignoring racial realities in others.38 What may surprise readers, though, is Driver’s
optimism about federal courts. In his other writing, Driver has
been a trenchant critic of the Warren Court, an institution he believes was more conservative than scholars typically realize.39 “Far
from storming the barricades,” Driver has argued, the Warren
Court was often a “defender of the status quo”40 and an exemplar

35 See p 413 (expressing skepticism about the Establishment Clause arguments mobilized against Cleveland, Ohio’s voucher program in Zelman).
36 Driver notes that Confederate flag bans present “the most vexing case of all” but
ultimately concludes that in certain circumstances such bans violate the First Amendment
(p 129).
37 112 Colum L Rev 404 (2012).
38 Id at 426–32.
39 Justin Driver, The Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 Cal L
Rev 1101, 1106 (2012) (“[T]he Warren Court frequently issued decisions that collided not
just with today’s liberal sensibilities, but also with the liberal sensibilities of that time.”).
40 Id at 1162.
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of “constitutional conservatism.”41 This is not a tale of the judiciary as a site of progressive reform.
And yet, federal courts are not just the protagonists but the
heroes of The Schoolhouse Gate. Chapter after chapter, Driver insists that the Supreme Court has led the way in recognizing students’ constitutional rights, often in the face of fierce popular resistance. Thus Driver presents Tinker, which upheld students’
First Amendment right to wear armbands protesting the Vietnam
War, as a “momentous innovation” in constitutional law at a time
when most Americans opposed rights for student protestors
(p 84). He argues that Plyler v Doe,42 which rejected Texas’ effort
to exclude undocumented immigrants from public schools,43 provided access to education for “one of modern society’s most marginalized, most vilified groups” (p 354). And he describes Engel v
Vitale,44 which invalidated teacher-led prayer,45 as a “quintessential example of the Supreme Court’s penchant for protecting constitutional rights even when doing so requires it to swim against
the tide of popular opinion” (p 374).
Even Brown becomes a story of court-led reform. No case has
inspired more pessimism about federal courts’ capacity to redress
racial inequality.46 Driver acknowledges Brown’s failings but
urges “a sober evaluation of what the opinion actually achieved,”
including “surprisingly brisk” school integration in the border
states, lower levels of racial isolation in southern schools than in
other parts of the country, and a powerful rhetorical shift in the
moral tone of segregation debates (pp 309–10). This is a measured
but sanguine approach to Brown’s legacy, and it exemplifies the
chord of optimism that runs throughout this book.
Driver’s hopefulness arises from two distinct but related
claims about federal courts. First, Driver believes that courts are
significantly less constrained by public opinion than many legal
scholars think. Over the last twenty years, a number of constitutional scholars have argued that court rulings tend to mirror majority sentiment, invalidating outliers but never getting too far

41

Id at 1105.
457 US 202 (1982).
43 Id at 230.
44 370 US 421 (1962).
45 Id at 424.
46 See, for example, Bell, Silent Covenants at 130 (cited in note 6); Rosenberg, The
Hollow Hope at 52 (cited in note 2) (arguing that Brown had little effect on desegregation).
Part II considers these and other critiques of Brown.
42
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ahead of the American public.47 Driver rebuts this theory, drawing on polling data to emphasize how out of step with national
norms the Supreme Court’s most important education cases have
been. This is not just an argument about judicial activism in the
1960s: Driver sees both Tinker, in which the Warren Court vindicated students’ free speech rights, and Morse v Frederick,48 in
which the Roberts Court upheld school administrators’ power to
suppress student speech,49 as evidence of the courts’ countermajoritarian capacities. Instead, his point is that federal courts do
more than ratify social movements that are already underway.50
Driver’s second claim is that federal courts properly exercise
their countermajoritarian power to protect minorities—and here
he means not just black children51 but also non-Christians,52
noncitizens,53 war protesters,54 and gender nonconforming students.55 The Schoolhouse Gate does not flinch when criticizing the
Supreme Court, and the chapters on school searches, suspensions, and corporal punishment contain stinging indictments of
governing law. But the clear message of this monograph is that,
more often than we give them credit for, federal courts advance
equality by protecting minority rights.
Distilling these two claims helps to square The Schoolhouse
Gate with Driver’s earlier work and to distinguish him from those
who see the last thirty years as a period of civil rights retrenchment. Driver’s critique of the Warren Court was that it forwent
“liberal victories [that] were attainable.”56 In his view, venerating

47 Driver describes this view as “consensus constitutionalism.” See Justin Driver,
The Consensus Constitution, 89 Tex L Rev 755, 756–57 (2011). See also Justin Driver,
Constitutional Outliers, 81 U Chi L Rev 929, 934–35 (2014) (rejecting the claim that the
Court invalidates laws only after popular consensus against them has developed). Part II
explores the origins and core claims of such “consensus” scholarship in more detail.
48 551 US 393 (2007) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to an Alaska principal’s
decision to suspend a student who displayed a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at
a parade across from his school).
49 Id at 397.
50 See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality 344 (Oxford 2006).
51 See Brown, 347 US at 495.
52 See Engel, 370 US at 424.
53 See Plyler, 457 US at 230.
54 See Tinker, 393 US at 511.
55 See G.G., 822 F3d at 715.
56 Driver, 100 Cal L Rev at 1105 (cited in note 39). Specifically, Driver argues that the
Warren Court could have done more to advance gender equality, protect religious minorities,
regulate the use of peremptory strikes in jury selection, develop Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and prevent disenfranchisement of jail inmates.
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the Warren Court obscures these missed opportunities and produces a cribbed vision of “liberal constitutional possibilities.”57
This thesis—essentially, that the Warren Court could have done
more—is consistent with a book that seeks to give the Court its
due as an agent of social change. Driver’s early writing encouraged left-leaning scholars not to settle for the liberalism of the
1960s. The Schoolhouse Gate seeks to convince readers that
courts are capable of the change he imagines.
II. LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS
At first pass, Professor Driver’s approach to federal courts
seems almost old-fashioned. Driver’s theory has much in common
with Professor Fiss’s famous argument that judges seek “what is
true, right, or just” and give meaning to “public values.”58 Like
Fiss, Driver thinks that the Constitution contains a “distinctive
public morality” that federal courts articulate and protect.59 He
also shares Fiss’s skepticism about textualism—a mode of analysis
Driver, with characteristic wit, calls the “‘Control+F’ theory of
constitutional interpretation”—and his comfort with judicial review60 (p 17). Driver, in other words, appears to be a good old legal
liberal.
Liberalism, of course, is a term that can be so broad as to be
meaningless. Following Professor Laura Kalman, I use the
phrase “legal liberalism” to refer to faith “in the potential of
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about [minorityprotective] . . . social reforms.”61 I also mean the word “liberal” to
capture a set of jurisprudential beliefs about courts’ role in mediating the relationship between the individual and the state.
This kind of liberalism has three basic tenets. First, and perhaps most important, legal liberals believe that rights protect the
individual against the state. The claim here is both that state

57

Id at 1106.
Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev 1, 9, 11 (1979).
59 See id at 11.
60 For Fiss, both textualism and anxiety about the countermajoritarian difficulty
stem from a category mistake: courts exist not to interpret or represent the preferences of a
particular group but to “give concrete meaning and application to our constitutional values.”
Id at 9. Compare id at 11 (“[C]ourts are not default institutions, [and] their rightful place
does not turn on the failure of another institution, whether it be the legislature or the
executive.”), with Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics 16 (Yale 1962) (coining the term “counter-majoritarian difficulty”).
61 Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 2 (quotation marks omitted)
(cited in note 9).
58
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power is the key danger in society and that law—specifically
rights—can counteract that danger. This view distinguishes liberals from a group of scholars, often called left critics or progressives, who see the uneven distribution of private rather than public power as the central oppressive force in American society.62
This particular aspect of legal liberalism, moreover, has no political bent: both left-leaning scholars like Driver and libertarians
like Professor Richard Epstein63 think abusive state power is the
threat against which law protects. The point is simply that individuals need rights to curb the state.
The second tenet of legal liberalism is that courts are the
proper institutions to safeguard constitutional rights. Again,
there are really two ideas here: legal liberals believe both that
courts are the correct entities to police the relationship between
the individual and the state and that courts should protect individuals (who bear constitutional rights) from majority will
(which, when realized in law or policy, can threaten those rights).
This conception of courts as defenders against the unruly majority
assumes that courts can act apart from political interests—that
is, that one can distinguish law from politics—and that individual
rights “‘trump’ or delimit the power of majorities.”64 This view of
courts has a more explicit political valence than the first tenet of
legal liberalism insofar as it has been associated with Supreme
Court rulings in favor of nonwhite people, noncitizens, and
women—and thus with “political liberalism”—since the middle of
the twentieth century.65

62 See Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 BU L Rev 765, 774 (1992) (distinguishing liberals from progressives). As Professor Robin West explains, progressives do
not dispute that state power prevents realization of the ideal “form of social life.” Id. They
do, however, depart from liberals in thinking that “the most serious impediments [to that
ideal] emanate from unjust concentrations of private [rather than state] power.” Id. See
also Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, eds, Left Legalism/Left Critique 5–7 (Duke 2002)
(distinguishing “left legalism [from] liberal legalism”).
63 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain
Quest for Limited Government (Harvard 2014). Of course, there is a yawning divide between liberals who seek small government in every domain and those who invoke rights
to protect the interests of historically subordinated or marginalized groups. The goal is not
to conflate these very different camps, nor to put Epstein in the school of legal liberalism
I am describing, but rather to highlight the shared concern about state power among libertarians and political liberals.
64 Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and
Freud’s Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U Pa L Rev 817, 840 (1986).
65 Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 2 (cited in note 9) (“Because of
the nation’s experience with the Warren Court, legal liberalism has been linked to political
liberalism since midcentury.”). Professor Laura Weinrib argues that the minority rights–
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The third tenet of legal liberalism is that the Constitution
represents a collective morality. Professor Robin West has written a
lucid analysis of the moral claims implicit in legal liberals’ understanding of the Constitution.66 As she explains, traditional legal
liberals are “the constitutionally faithful”: they see the Constitution
“as rooted in a higher, deeper, more ‘constitutive,’ or simply ‘prior’
morality, and not simply a more coercive legal command.”67 This
is why Fiss describes constitutional adjudication as the process of
discerning a “public morality” rather than just the superior legal
rule.68 It is also why, for legal liberals, something like wearing the
Confederate flag can be politically noxious and even immoral but
constitutionally permitted and in that sense reflective of a desirable society. Because the Constitution “provides a higher norm”—
a sort of “super-moral[ity]”—it prevails when conflicts between
constitutional and other moral commitments arise.69 This framework makes it incredibly important to get constitutional interpretation right. As a result, legal liberal scholarship tends to focus
on doctrine, and particularly the binding constitutional doctrine
generated by the Supreme Court.
These three views—rights restrain state power, courts protect minority rights, and constitutional rights impose moral obligations on the state—constitute the core of legal liberalism as I
employ the term. Scholars one might describe as legal liberals70
subscribe to these views with greater and less fealty. The moral
claim, in particular, is not shared by every legal liberal. I suspect
focused conception of legal liberalism, which “blossomed in the late New Deal and prevailed in the postwar period,” was preceded by a period in which the meaning of liberalism
was less tied to protection of minorities and much more up for grabs. Laura Weinrib,
Against Intolerance: The Red Scare Roots of Legal Liberalism, J Gilded Age & Progressive
Era *1 (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
66 West, 72 BU L Rev at 782–83 (cited in note 62). See also West, Normative Jurisprudence at 47 (cited in note 9) (describing liberalism’s normative commitments).
67 West, 72 BU L Rev at 783 (cited in note 62).
68 Fiss, 93 Harv L Rev at 11 (cited in note 58).
69 West, 72 BU L Rev at 783 (cited in note 62).
70 Here I would include Fiss, Professor Laurence Tribe, and many left-leaning jurists
since the Warren Court. See, for example, Fiss, 93 Harv L Rev at 9 (cited in note 58);
Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98
Harv L Rev 592, 595–614 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s approach to legal
problems is insufficiently attentive to the distribution of wealth and social inequality);
Laurence H. Tribe, Jeremy Waldron, and Mark Tushnet, On Judicial Review: Laurence
H. Tribe, Jeremy Waldron, and Mark Tushnet Debate, 52 Dissent 81, 81–83 (2005) (debating an “End Judicial Review Amendment” to the US Constitution). See also the Honorable
William Wayne Justice, The New Awakening: Judicial Activism in a Conservative Age, 43
Sw L J 657, 664 (1989) (“As Judge [J. Skelly] Wright has characterized it, the Warren
Court activism was ‘judging in the service of conscience.’”) (citations omitted).
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there are many academics and judges who would distinguish law
from morals and nonetheless endorse a vision of courts as countermajoritarian rights-protectors.71 But the idea that constitutional
rights trump other rights, and do so because they reflect the most
valuable public values, is at the heart of legal liberalism—and
this, as West points out, is a kind of constitutional morality.72
This theory of constitutional law is exemplified by Fiss’s writing on the Warren Court. In the early 1990s, Fiss cast that Court
not only as a revolutionary “program of constitutional reform” but
also as an institution that led the revolution.73 As he put it: “[T]he
Court did not act in a political or social vacuum. . . . Yet the truth
of the matter is that it was the Warren Court that spurred the
great changes to follow, and inspired and protected those who
sought to implement them.”74 More recently, Fiss has doubled
down on his claim that judges ought to seek justice, rather than
just rationality or transparency, and has insisted that achieving
equality is “fully within the competence of the judiciary.”75 Here
we have the hallmarks of legal liberalism: a morality-inflected
understanding of constitutional rights, a juriscentric conception
of social change, and a muscular vision of courts’ ability to produce that change.
This way of thinking about courts has been subject to ongoing
critique within the legal academy over the last three decades.
Although legal liberalism has many detractors,76 two challenges
are especially relevant to situating The Schoolhouse Gate.
71 See Fiss, 90 Yale L J at 1007–08 (cited in note 10) (distinguishing between different strains of positivism in legal scholarship). As Fiss notes, at least one form of positivism,
which he calls “ethical positivism,” distinguishes law from morals in order to bring existing
law in line with a moral framework. Thus, ethical positivism “could be the creed of the
reformist” who seeks to make law “more just.” Id at 1007. See also West, Normative Jurisprudence at 67–71 (cited in note 9) (arguing that early positivists sought to render law
more moral).
72 West, 72 BU L Rev at 781 (cited in note 62).
73 Owen M. Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 Yale L J 1117, 1118 (1991).
74 Id.
75 Owen Fiss, Another Equality, 20 Issues in Legal Scholarship 1, 17 (2004). Fiss is
talking here about a substantive conception of equality in which

certain social practices, including but not limited to discrimination, should be
condemned not because of any unfairness in the transaction attributable to the
poor fit between means and ends, but rather because such practices create or
perpetuate the subordination of the group of which the individual excluded or
rejected is a member.
Id at 3–4.
76 Influential critiques that fall outside the scope of this Review include those advanced by law and economics scholars who reject legal liberals’ focus on doctrine and those
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The first came from constitutional theorists and political scientists who objected to the idea that courts are pioneers of social
progress. This critique often centered on the origins and legacy of
Brown. Citing grassroots advocacy that preceded that opinion and
its slow, uneven implementation across the South, scholars argued
that the Supreme Court tends to follow social movements, not
drive them.77 For some this was a descriptive claim: the Supreme
Court is “unlikely to interpret the Constitution in ways that radically depart from contemporary popular opinion” and should
thus be understood as a body that affirms consensus or at best
breaks ties when the nation is deeply divided.78 For others, the
claim was more normative: in a democratic society riddled with
inequality, federal courts cannot79 and therefore should not80 lead
social reform. To do so is dangerous because bad and unpredictable things happen when unelected judges outpace majority
preferences.

articulated by originalists (and others) concerned with an expansive vision of the federal
judiciary’s role in a system of separated powers.
77 For the classic version of this claim, see Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 40 (cited
in note 2) (“Although the conventional wisdom . . . is that federal courts, through Brown
and its progeny, played a crucial role in producing both changes in civil rights and an
active civil rights movement, truth is not thereby assured.”).
78 Klarman, 93 Nw U L Rev at 192 (cited in note 1). Klarman continues:
Most of the Court’s famous individual rights decisions of the past half century
involve either the Justices seizing upon a dominant national consensus and imposing it on resisting outliers or intervening on an issue where the nation is
narrowly divided and awarding victory to one side or seeking to split the difference.
See also Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics at 490 (cited in note 1) (arguing
that the project of the Warren Court, beginning with Brown, was to “force the South to
conform to northern—that is, national—norms”). But see Driver, 89 Tex L Rev at 756–58
(cited in note 47) (describing this scholarship as “consensus constitutionalism” and critiquing both its premises and its implications).
79 Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 70–71 (cited in note 2) (“[C]ourts had virtually no
direct effect on ending discrimination in the key fields of education, voting, transportation,
accommodations and public places, and housing. . . . Brown and its progeny stand for the
proposition that courts are impotent to produce significant social reform.”). See also
Friedman, The Will of the People at 303 (cited in note 2) (challenging “the image of the
Supreme Court as an institution that runs contrary to popular will”).
80 Most scholars in the “should not” camp worry that the Supreme Court provokes
backlash or triggers other perverse consequences when it gets too far in front of majority
preferences. See Post and Siegel, 42 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 376 (cited in note 4) (identifying
Professors Michael Klarman, William Eskridge, and Cass Sunstein as “three eminent theorists of backlash” and arguing that each “overestimate[s] the costs of backlash and [ ] underestimate[s] its benefits”). But see Driver, 123 Yale L J at 2632 n 76 (cited in note 7)
(arguing that Klarman’s argument “is an imperfect fit for the standard perversity narrative” because Klarman believes post-Brown backlash indirectly hastened egalitarian social
reforms).
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In a related line of scholarship, which Dean Risa Goluboff
calls “the new civil rights history,” historians have called for a less
“court-centered [and] major-case-centered” conception of legal development.81 This historical work is not identical to the critique of
legal liberalism that emerged from debates over Brown—that
scholarship is very much focused on major Supreme Court opinions,
while the new civil rights historians aim to decenter courts.82 But
both bodies of writing seek to debunk the “romantic vision of the
[Supreme] Court as countermajoritarian hero.”83 In this respect,
they are part of a single, powerful objection to legal liberalism.84
The second critique of legal liberalism came from critical theorists who aimed to expose courts’ part in perpetuating inequality. This too is a big tent. It includes, of course, the critical legal
studies (CLS) movement, which rejected the distinction between
law and politics and advanced a wide-ranging critique of rights.85
As CLS scholars noted, throughout American history, rights have
more often been mobilized to “solidify the holdings” of the powerful than to protect the marginalized.86 Rights are also predicated
on an individualistic, “alienat[ing]” vision of society.87 And while
constitutional rights protect citizens against the state, they offer
no affirmative entitlement “to state action that might counter”
the most insidious sources of oppression, including private racism
and private wealth.88 Rights, in sum, are not all they’re cracked
up to be: they belong to individuals, hermetically sealed off from

81

Goluboff, 126 Harv L Rev at 2312, 2319 (cited in note 1).
Id at 2321 (“The law does not change because courts make decisions.”). See also
Guinier and Torres, 123 Yale L J at 2748 (cited in note 9) (noting that a “growing chorus
of scholars [ ] argue that change neither begins nor ends with the courts”).
83 Klarman, 93 Nw U L Rev at 192 (cited in note 1).
84 There is also the related, deeper critique of judicial review voiced by Professor
Waldron, among others. See Waldron, 115 Yale L J at 1369 (cited in note 5) (critiquing
judicial review as a democratically illegitimate practice that protects rights no better than
legislatures). See also Kramer, The People Themselves at 8 (cited in note 3) (describing the
relationship between judicial review and “popular constitutionalism”). Although objections to judicial review and judicial supremacy are critiques of legal liberalism, my focus
here is on the narrower claim that courts cannot in fact drive social progress even if we
want them to.
85 See, for example, Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 243 (Harvard
1987) (“[L]egal change simply reflects the dominance of whichever pernicious elite has
grabbed a greater degree of control.”); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical
Legal Studies, in Brown and Halley, Left Legalism/Left Critique at 183–88 (cited in note
62) (summarizing the rights critique).
86 West, Normative Jurisprudence at 122 (cited in note 9).
87 Id at 126.
88 Id at 123.
82
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one another, and they provide much less protection than we actually need. Rights, moreover, “legitimate privilege” by perpetuating the fallacy that all is well so long as the state stays in its
lane.89
This CLS critique dovetailed with feminist and critical race
theorists’ concerns about legal liberalism. Scholars in those traditions had a much more ambivalent relationship to rights, which,
as Professor Patricia Williams put it, “feel[ ] so new in the mouths
of most black people.”90 Many feminists and critical race theorists
rejected the antinormativity of CLS scholarship, emphasizing the
empowering aspect of rights discourse and urging fellow progressives “to read the Constitution as a text of liberation.”91 But they
shared the view that constitutional law ignored and therefore
supported private discrimination—in particular, patriarchy and
racism—and the sense that legal liberals exacerbate this problem
by deifying courts.92 This analysis led feminists and critical race
theorists to develop less doctrinal forms of scholarship focused on
the ways that race and gender affect experiences of state power.
As a methodological matter, this meant prioritizing personal narratives and the untold stories “of those who have seen and felt the
falsity of the liberal promise.”93
There are many points of convergence between these critiques
of legal liberalism. These schools share members: Professor Mark
Tushnet, for instance, is both a leading CLS scholar and an interlocutor in debates over Brown,94 and Professor Michael Klarman
has challenged both court-centric histories of civil rights and legal

89 Id. See also generally Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal L Rev
673 (1992); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex L Rev 1363 (1984); Peter Gabel,
Book Review, Taking Rights Seriously, 91 Harv L Rev 302 (1977).
90 Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 Harv CR–CL L Rev 401, 431 (1987).
91 Matsuda, 22 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 341 (cited in note 6). See also Joan C. Williams,
Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62
NYU L Rev 429, 481 (1987) (“[M]any progressive lawyers believe that the idea of rights
has great liberating potential.”).
92 See, for example, West, 72 BU L Rev at 776 (cited in note 62) (“The Constitution
apparently leaves untouched the very conditions of subordination, oppression, and coercion that relegate some to ‘lesser lives’ of drudgery, fear, and stultifying self-hatred.”).
93 Matsuda, 22 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 324 (cited in note 6).
94 See Tushnet, 62 Tex L Rev at 1363 (cited in note 89) (developing the critique of
rights); Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 Va L Rev 1693,
1694 (2004) (“Brown did not transform education in the segregated South, much less
American race relations.”). See also Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts 194 (Princeton 2000) (advocating “populist” constitutional law).
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liberals’ fetishistic relationship to the Constitution.95 These critiques also share origins in legal realism and, specifically, in the
realists’ exhortation to “abandon the[ ] traditional focus on doctrinal logic” in favor of more functional accounts of law.96 It would
be a mistake to tell this intellectual history as if it has discrete
camps or a definite start date.
The purpose of distinguishing these critiques, though, is to
isolate two separate points: one about courts’ relationship to popular opinion and one about courts’ role in an unequal society. The
historical claim is that legal liberals overestimate courts’ contribution to the advancement of minority rights. The critical claim
is that courts are implicated in an oppressive social order in which
rights, at least as jurists have traditionally understood them, are
part of the problem. In other words, the historical critique takes
issue with the “legal” part of legal liberalism, while critical theorists take issue with liberalism itself.
Together, these two critiques have had a lasting effect on the
way scholars think and write about federal courts. Although it is
now rare for law review articles to begin with poems or Angela
Davis quotations,97 the impact of the critical turn in legal scholarship can be seen in a discipline that is increasingly interdisciplinary and decreasingly focused on courts. Since roughly 1990,
pushback against legal liberalism by historians and critical theorists has driven constitutional scholarship downward and outward, toward law made by lower courts and interpretation of the
Constitution by actors other than judges, including legislators,
bureaucrats, and laypeople. The response—dare I say backlash—
to legal liberalism has also produced a much more cynical academy in which it is decidedly unhip to think that the judiciary can

95 For Klarman’s classic account of Brown, see Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil
Rights at 344 (cited in note 50). For his critique of constitutionalism, see Klarman, 93 Nw
U L Rev at 145 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the “proffered justifications for constitutionalism” are neither “unambiguously attractive,” nor do they describe particularly well our
constitutional system). See also Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the
Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 Va L Rev 631, 631 (1999) (exploring the tendency to “conduct[ ] [ ] transparently political debate[s]”—in that case, the debate over Bill Clinton’s
impeachment—“in constitutional terms”).
96 Williams, 62 NYU L Rev at 433 (cited in note 91) (situating CLS and feminist
scholarship as an outgrowth of legal realism). See also Laura Kalman, Book Review, Brief
Lives, 127 Yale L J 1638, 1672 (2018) (exploring the legacy of legal realism); Brian Leiter,
Is There an ‘American’ Jurisprudence?, 17 Oxford J Legal Stud 367, 382–85 (1997) (connecting CLS to legal realism but identifying key distinctions between the movements).
97 See, for example, Matsuda, 22 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 333 (cited in note 6); Williams,
22 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 401 (cited in note 90).
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or will save the day. Thus it is now common for legal scholars to
study “the Constitution outside the courts”98 and to ask whether
it is wise to “constitutionalize” issues that could be conceived another way.99
This is in some respects a story about left-leaning academics’
reactions to an increasingly conservative judiciary.100 But it is also
(and I think more fundamentally) a story about the professionalization of the legal academy, which brought with it methodological diversity,101 and about legal scholars’ persistent anxiety about
the judiciary’s role in a democracy.102 The last three decades have
witnessed the rise of “constitutional skepticism,”103 which is to
say, real doubt about the Constitution’s normative value, and for
those who still embrace the federal Constitution, deep concern
about the judiciary’s ability to safeguard minority rights.104
98 John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 Harv L Rev
1539, 1546 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (discussing the literature on
legislative, administrative, and popular constitutionalism). See also, for example, Bruce
Ackerman, We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution 12 (Belknap 2014) (arguing that landmark statutes ought to be part of the constitutional canon); Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 Tex L Rev 1897, 1901 (2013) (exploring
how administrative actors develop constitutional meaning).
99 See, for example, Klarman, 85 Va L Rev at 652 (cited in note 95) (identifying the
“insidious consequence[s] of the pervasive constitutionalization of the impeachment debate”); Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 Yale L J 104, 196–214 (2015) (cautioning against “constitutionaliz[ing] the internal structures of the Executive Branch” in a manner that would limit Executive discretion
over immigration enforcement). The point here is not that Professors Klarman, Adam Cox,
and Cristina Rodriguez are wrong about the perils of constitutionalizing debates over impeachment and immigration but rather that their writing reflects a moment in the intellectual history of legal scholarship in which academics are highly sensitive to the consequences of inserting the judiciary into political debates.
100 See, for example, Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 132–39 (cited
in note 9) (describing how the Reagan Administration “transform[ed] the judiciary through
the appointment of conservative judges”). See generally, for example, Nancy Scherer and
Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on the Federal Judiciary, 62 Political
Rsrch Q 366 (2009).
101 See Kennedy and Fisher, The Canon of American Legal Thought at 7–8 (cited in
note 9) (discussing the “fall of methodological consensus” and the emergence of “eclecticism” in legal scholarship).
102 See David A. Strauss, The Neo-Hamiltonian Temptation, 123 Yale L J 2676, 2680
(2014) (arguing that popular constitutionalism and other “neo-Hamiltonian” efforts to defend
judicial review against democratic objections arise from discomfort about “the ways in
which our system is not democratic”).
103 West, 72 BU L Rev at 774 (cited in note 62). See also Driver, 123 Yale L J at 2621
(cited in note 7).
104 See Michelman, 94 BU L Rev at 1148 (cited in note 7). As Michelman notes, there are
still many more scholars who embrace the Constitution but object to excessive constitutionalism than those, like West and Professor Louis Michael Seidman, who “express[ ] [ ] doubt
about the value of the constitutional project tout court.” Id at 1142. See also Louis Michael
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Driver rejects both kinds of skepticism. The Schoolhouse Gate
advances a full-throated account of the federal judiciary’s promise
and a morally rich vision of constitutional law. In discussing the
scope of the Eighth Amendment, for example, Driver calls corporal punishment “an atrocity” and an “act of barbarism” that future generations will regard “as a source of shame and embarrassment” (p 184). This is moral language about how to interpret
the Constitution—language Driver uses with full knowledge of
the historical and critical movements in constitutional law.
Driver, moreover, trains his critique on the state. To return to the
corporal punishment example, he clearly thinks it more objectionable for a public school principal than a private school principal
or a parent to hit a child. That is not to say that Driver condones
the private activity but rather that it is state action that triggers
his conviction that law must step in.105
Driver is not, however, an entirely old-school legal liberal.
Though it is court-focused, The Schoolhouse Gate relies on sources
unseen in early legal liberal scholarship, including Gallup polls
and newspaper archives. Driver is keen not just to postulate but
to prove that federal courts have had an appreciable impact on
public schools. His book is also built, from its very first lines,
around personal narratives. The Schoolhouse Gate teaches readers that Robert Meyer was a father of six who refused offers to
help pay the fine he incurred for instructing students in German
just after World War I;106 that Savannah Redding left her middle
school and developed ulcers after being strip searched for allegedly distributing prescription-strength ibuprofen;107 and that
James Ingraham’s eighth grade classmates called him “Rain
Bummy” after he was paddled so intensely by his principal that,

Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience 5 (Oxford 2012); West, 72 BU L Rev at 770 (cited in
note 62); Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes
Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It) 167 (Oxford 2006) (“[O]ur Constitution is
sufficiently defective to warrant significant revision and repair.”).
105 To be clear, Driver’s emphasis on the state is not merely a choice to work within
the confines of current state action doctrine. As I read The Schoolhouse Gate, Driver appears to think that, when it comes to the conduct constitutional law ought to target, there
is something worse about abuses of state power than private violence. I take the implicit
belief here to be that the Constitution is a social contract whose legitimacy and validity
depends on the state following the rules.
106 See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 396–97 (1923) (holding that Nebraska’s restrictions on foreign-language education violated the Due Process Clause).
107 See Safford Unified School District No 1 v Redding, 557 US 364, 368–69 (2009)
(holding that the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment but that school officials
were entitled to qualified immunity).
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three days later, he had “fluid oozing” from a swollen six-inch
bruise108 (p 165–66). We also learn that, every day beginning in
fifth grade, Driver took a city bus and two subway lines before
walking nearly a mile to reach the public school he attended in
Northwest Washington, DC, “where educational outcomes were
much brighter and the students bodies, not incidentally, were
much whiter” than his own (p 26).
This personal approach to a book about constitutional law
would not make sense without the critique of legal liberalism.
Driver’s mixed methods, quest for proof, and emphasis on lived
experiences of the law are an implicit endorsement of interdisciplinary legal scholarship and critical legal methods, if not the critical turn away from constitutionalism. His entire project, moreover, is an explicit reaction to the historical critique of legal
liberalism, which he thinks is largely wrong. Driver writes in response to the wave of legal scholars that came before him, informed but not convinced by their claims. This is not quite traditional legal liberalism, though it does seek to revive moral debates
about the right way to read and enforce the Constitution.109 This
is the new legal liberalism, a mode of constitutional scholarship
that uses fresh methods to argue that we should still extol, study,
and storm the federal courts.
III. THE CONTEXTUAL CONSTITUTION
The question is whether Professor Driver is right to be so optimistic. Driver’s view of the federal judiciary develops from his
focus on one very particular institution: the public school.
Although The Schoolhouse Gate discusses the First, Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, it is not really a study of
individual rights. At its core this is a book about the law of public
schools, no matter which constitutional provision applies.
The Schoolhouse Gate is, in other words, an example of what
Dean Heather Gerken calls “domain-centered” constitutional law.110
108 See Ingraham v Wright, 430 US 651, 653–57 (1977) (holding that the Due Process
Clause does not require a hearing prior to corporal punishment in public schools and that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply to such a hearing).
109 Of course, those debates never stopped in the pages of law reviews, which still
publish (and perhaps prioritize) normative scholarship about constitutional law. But normative doctrinal scholarship has receded and diminished in stature as the legal academy
has grown more interdisciplinary.
110 Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 Harv
L Rev 104, 122 (2007). In using this term, Gerken follows Professors Robert Post and Michael
Walzer. See generally Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community,
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Gerken uses this phrase to describe Justice Anthony Kennedy’s approach to race in Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle
School District No 1,111 the 2007 case that invalidated a Seattle
school district’s desegregation plan.112 As she notes, Justice Kennedy
defected from “the colorblindness camp” in Parents Involved and,
much to Court watchers’ surprise, began “to brainstorm[ ] about
the most useful race-conscious strategies the state can use to construct the educational space.”113 Gerken attributes this about-face
to Justice Kennedy’s long-standing belief that public schools are
special sites for “inculcating civic morality.”114 She argues that
Justice Kennedy was able to depart from his traditional approach
to race because he saw Parents Involved as a case that was foremost about schools, and only incidentally about race.115 This kind
of “displacement,” as she puts it, can be a powerful way to rethink
racial inequality.116
Gerken’s point is that a “radically contextualized” approach
to constitutional analysis may lead to more nuanced constitutional jurisprudence.117 Although her essay is about equal protection, and specifically Justice Kennedy’s views on race, it raises
the broader question: Should we be thinking about more—or even
all—of constitutional law in domain-centered terms?
There is no question that the Constitution operates differently in different contexts. Free speech looks different in a school
than it does on a street corner. Due process is a different idea at
the nation’s border than it is in a coffee shop. This is a descriptive
claim about how constitutional cases tend to come down in certain
settings. It can also be understood as a normative claim about

Management (Harvard 1995); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism
and Equality (Basic Books 1983). As she explains, her use of Post’s term is somewhat
closer to Walzer’s phrase “spheres of justice,” which describes a notion of justice tied to
institutional context, than to Post’s conception of the three “domains” of First Amendment
law (community, management, and democracy). Gerken, 121 Harv L Rev at 106 n 12. See
also Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, “Spheres of Justice”: An Exchange (NY Review
of Books, July 21, 1983), archived at http://perma.cc/4YKU-9JPD (describing Walzer’s
view); Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 Mich L Rev 1422, 1425 (1996) (describing Post’s).
111 551 US 701 (2007).
112 Id at 745–48.
113 Gerken, 121 Harv L Rev at 104, 106 (cited in note 110).
114 Id at 106.
115 See id.
116 Id at 122.
117 Gerken, 121 Harv L Rev at 122 (cited in note 110).
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how the Constitution ought to work.118 For those who endorse the
normative view, constitutional rights actually mean something
different depending on where they are invoked; equality, for example, means something different in a prison than in a school. If
this is right, we cannot interpret the Constitution until we have
a theory of the spheres it governs—a theory about the purpose of
public schools, or prisons, or national borders, or voting booths.
And if either the descriptive or the normative claim about constitutional domains is correct, we will understand the Constitution
much better if we focus on places or plaintiffs rather than specific
clauses.
From this perspective, it makes perfect sense to talk about
“the constitutional law of schools” instead of, say, First or Fourth
Amendment law. This is simply how constitutional law works: an
eighth-grade student asserting her right to be free from unreasonable searches has more in common with an eighth grader seeking protection of her right to protest than an adult pressing a
Fourth Amendment claim outside school. The Constitution is contextual, and we should study it as such. I take this to be the animating theory of Driver’s book, and I find it compelling. The
Schoolhouse Gate presents a powerful argument not just for students’ rights but for a theory of constitutional rights that is attuned to the particular values and histories of American social
institutions.
The problem, though, is that the public school is an exceptional institution. Schoolchildren are perhaps the most sympathetic plaintiffs in all of constitutional law. They are less culpable
than adults, or at least courts tend to treat them as such;119 they
are young enough for judicially imposed institutional reforms like
racial or gender integration to have a real effect on their perceptions of the world; and they are acutely subject to state power—
after all, they cannot leave the building until the school bell rings.

118 Gerken does not endorse a wholly domain-centered approach to constitutional law.
In fact, she expresses concern that too much domain specificity can obscure connections
between bodies of constitutional law, such as education and election law. See id at 128
(“Sometimes a domain-centered narrative can be too tidy.”). As she notes, this skepticism
distinguishes her from Post, who resists “efforts to develop a unified theory of the First
Amendment across domains,” and from Justice Kennedy, who seems to believe that the
Constitution should be analyzed differently in schools. Id at 126 n 78, citing Post, Constitutional Domains at 16 (cited in note 110).
119 See, for example, Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 471–72 (2012) (discussing children’s “diminished culpability” in the course of holding that mandatory sentences of life
without parole for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment).
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Schoolchildren are, in short, very easy to want to protect, which
is why courts have so often protected them.120
The question that follows is whether the public school is an
uncommonly hopeful site for an assessment of the judiciary. Take
the case Plyler v Doe. As Part I mentions, Plyler concerned undocumented immigrant children’s access to public schools—specifically, a Texas law that permitted the state to withhold funds for
educating unauthorized immigrant children from local school districts and a district that responded by charging those children tuition to attend public school. The Supreme Court held that Texas’s
law violated the Equal Protection Clause.121 For Driver, this holding is an example of the Supreme Court’s ability and willingness
to protect “vilified groups” in the face of virulent public opinion
(p 354). As he explains, Plyler “prevent[ed] the Texas measure
from spreading to other states” and “single-handedly enabled innumerable children to use education to expand both their minds
and their horizons” (p 353–54).
This is right and important, but for immigration scholars,
Plyler is an example of the path more often avoided than taken.
Notwithstanding its soaring language about the rights of all
noncitizens, including those “whose presence in this country is
unlawful,”122 Plyler is generally understood as a case about schoolchildren rather than a reflection of the Supreme Court’s constitutional immigration jurisprudence.123 This is in part because the
Plyler majority stressed that schools are special124 and that children
lack culpability for illegal entry125 and in part because the Court
has opted not to extend Plyler’s reasoning in other immigration

120 See Kennedy, 123 Yale L J at 3071 (cited in note 27) (noting that Brown “invalidated narrowly de jure segregation in public primary and secondary schooling” rather than
“gestur[ing] broadly toward the proscription of segregation in other spheres of social life”).
121 Plyler, 457 US at 230.
122 Id at 210.
123 See, for example, Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public
Education: An Analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U Pitt L Rev 409, 429 (1983) (“Despite the
controversy it engendered, Plyler after all affects only undocumented alien children, only in
the area of public education, and then only when state action is not sanctioned by Congress.”).
124 Plyler 457 US at 221 (“We have recognized the public schools as a most vital civil
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government, and as the primary
vehicle for transmitting the values on which our society rests.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
125 Id at 220 (“But [the statute] is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little
control.”).
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cases.126 More than thirty years after Plyler, immigrants’ constitutional rights remain underdeveloped—it is still unclear when noncitizens bear Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights127—and undocumented noncitizens have particularly shaky
claims to constitutional protection.128 Courts have long wavered
between a territorial theory of the Constitution, in which rights
hinge on physical presence, and a status-based theory, in which
rights extend only or more fully to those whose presence is legal.129
The tension between these theories persists and results in unnerving debates about how poorly unauthorized immigrants can
be treated before the Constitution kicks in.
Consider, for instance, the due process concerns raised by the
Trump Administration’s family separation and detention policies130 or Garza v Hargan,131 a 2017 case in which an en banc DC
Circuit debated (without resolving) whether a seventeen-year-old
undocumented immigrant had the right to an abortion.132 Both
cases illustrate how immigration status can alter settled constitutional law. Or consider Trump v Hawaii,133 the recent decision
on the Trump Administration’s travel ban. The majority decision
in that case—which reasoned that courts ought not peer beyond

126 Linda E. Carter, Intermediate Scrutiny under Fire: Will Plyler Survive State Legislation to Exclude Undocumented Children from School?, 31 USF L Rev 345, 392 (1997)
(“[T]he Court has chosen not to expand the Plyler case.”).
127 See United States v Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F3d 664, 672 n 1 (7th Cir 2015), cert
denied, 136 S Ct 1655 (2016) (departing from the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits and
relying on Plyler to hold that undocumented noncitizens may invoke the Second Amendment
right to bear arms). See also Emma Kaufman, Segregation by Citizenship, 132 Harv L Rev
*40–57 (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author) (discussing the scope of noncitizens’ Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
128 See Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial Distinction, 16 Georgetown Immig L J 407,
408–10 (2002) (tracing the history of constitutional doctrines distinguishing legal from
illegal entrants).
129 Id. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and
Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 Georgetown Immig L J 365, 387 (2002) (discussing the
significance of Justice Stephen Breyer’s invocation of a “basic territorial distinction” between those in and outside US borders in Zadvydas v Davis), citing Bosniak, 16
Georgetown Immig L J at 407 (cited in note 128); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing,
and Immigration Law, 92 Cal L Rev 373, 387 n 57 (2004) (noting that noncitizens outside
the United States lack enforceable rights to enter and in some cases lack rights to other
constitutional protection as well).
130 See Adam Cox and Ryan Goodman, Detention of Migrant Families as “Deterrence”:
Ethical Flaws and Empirical Doubt (Just Security, June 22, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/J6D5-SBLG (discussing the ethical and legal questions raised by the policy of
separating families arriving at the US-Mexico border and detaining families facing removal).
131 874 F3d 735 (DC Cir 2017) (en banc).
132 Id at 743.
133 138 S Ct 2392 (2018).
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the four corners of executive orders on immigration, no matter
how compelling the evidence of discriminatory intent134—is a “disquieting” example of federal courts’ long-standing ambivalence
about noncitizens’ entitlement to full constitutional protection
and tendency to defer to political branch decisions on immigration
policy, particularly those justified by national security.135 Given
this legal landscape, Plyler is often categorized as a case of school
exceptionalism, the high point in an otherwise uninspiring body
of constitutional doctrine.
It is also illuminating to ask if Driver’s optimism could hold
in prisons. In some respects, the prison and the public school are
parallel domains. Like schools, prisons are citizenship-making institutions that aim to impart (and impose) a certain model of civic
membership.136 Like schools, prisons reflect the hardest problems
in American politics, including the legacies of slavery and Jim
Crow. Like schools, prisons were subject to a “hands-off” jurisprudence until the middle of the twentieth century, when federal
courts began to reform conditions of confinement in American
prisons and jails.137 Like schools, prisons are often framed as
places that are difficult to run or properly run by subfederal governments and, thus, as institutions that federal courts should
hesitate to regulate.138 And like schools, prisons have long been
134

Id at 2417.
Adam Cox, Ryan Goodman, and Cristina Rodríguez, The Radical Supreme Court
Travel Ban Opinion—But Why It Might Not Apply to Other Immigrants’ Rights Cases (Just
Security, June 27, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/WFS5-EVYX (describing Trump v
Hawaii as “radical” but noting that its holding may be limited to cases “involving questions
of motive and proof” that concern “immigration policies implicating national security”).
136 There is an enormous literature on prisons as sites of citizenship creation and social control. For two classic examples, see Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in
John Bowring, ed, 1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 365, 420 (William Tait 1843); Michel
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 231 (Vintage Books 1995) (Alan
Sheridan, trans).
137 See Feeley and Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State at 30–46
(cited in note 19); Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 Cornell L Rev 357, 359 (2018).
138 Compare Turner v Safley, 482 US 78, 84–85 (1987):
135

Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise. . . . Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to
the responsibility of th[e] [political] branches, and separation of powers concerns
counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is involved,
federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate
prison authorities.
with Missouri v Jenkins, 515 US 70, 99 (1995) (“[O]ur cases recognize that local autonomy
of school districts is a vital national tradition and that a district court must strive to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system.”) (citations omitted). See
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sites for heated debate over the efficacy and propriety of equitable
remedies including, most famously, the structural injunction.139
But when it comes to prisons, it is difficult to tell a story in
which courts are heroes. There is no question that courts reformed
American penal institutions in the 1970s and in some cases continue to do so today.140 But the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world;141 one in three “black American
males . . . can expect to go to prison in his lifetime”;142 and prisoners in some states live in shockingly brutal circumstances for
years or decades at a time.143 Among other things, sensory deprivation and extreme isolation,144 suicide and self-harm,145 rape,146

also Procunier v Martinez, 416 US 396, 409–13 (1974) (citing Tinker and comparing schools
to prisons in a case concerning censorship of prisoner mail).
139 See Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens
When Courts Run Government 11, 139 (Yale 2003) (critiquing the use of equitable remedies in institutional reform litigation). See also Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration
and the Paradox of Prison Conditions Litigation, 44 L & Society Rev 731, 731–37 (2010)
(describing how the “policy feedback effect[s]” of structural injunctions contributed to the
growth of Florida’s prison population).
140 See Feeley and Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State at 39–45
(cited in note 19) (describing the 1970s reforms); Brown v Plata, 563 US 493, 538–45 (2011)
(affirming an order imposing population limits on California state prisons).
141 Tyjen Tsai and Paola Scommegna, U.S. Has World’s Highest Incarceration Rate,
(Population Reference Bureau, Aug 10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/YGJ3-PT9D.
142 Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
regarding Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System *1 (The Sentencing
Project, Aug 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5HLG-NKW3.
143 See, for example, Aiming to Reduce Time-in-Cell: Reports from Correctional Systems on the Numbers of Prisoners in Restricted Housing and on the Potential of Policy
Changes to Bring About Reforms *5 (Association of State Correctional Administrators and
Arthur Liman Public Interest Program at Yale Law School, Nov 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/AFH8-XWHY (finding that an estimated 80,000–100,000 people were held
in solitary confinement in 2014); Class Action Complaint, Dockery v Epps, No 3:13-cv00326, *1–4 (SD Miss filed May 30, 2013) (describing “horrific conditions” in a Mississippi
prison where prisoners lived in total darkness in cells with loose electrical wires, rats, and
“gangrenous wounds”).
144 See Aiming to Reduce Time-in-Cell at *4–6 (cited in note 143) (describing solitary
confinement).
145 Margaret Noonan, Harley Rohloff, and Scott Ginder, Mortality in Local Jails and
State Prisons, 2000–2013—Statistical Tables *1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Aug 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/U3BQ-LCSZ (documenting rising suicide rates in prisons and
jails).
146 Allen J. Beck, Ramona R. Rantala, and Jessica Rexroat, Sexual Victimization Reported by Adult Correctional Authorities, 2009–11 *1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jan
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/H6YD-L7HJ (documenting rates of “sexual victimization” in prisons since 2009).
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unpaid labor,147 and grossly inadequate medical care148 remain
real problems in many prisons. This is in part because institutional dynamics in the American political system incentivize
harsh prosecution and sentencing, which in turn fill prisons with
far too many people.149 But it is also because courts decline to regulate penal institutions, even when they can.
Take two seemingly similar cases on strip searching: Safford
Unified School District No 1 v Redding150 and Florence v Board of
Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington.151 In Safford, the
Roberts Court held that school searches require reasonable suspicion and that the decision to search thirteen-year-old Savannah
Redding’s underwear for contraband pills violated her Fourth
Amendment rights. Two years later, the Court in Florence upheld
strip searches of detainees entering jails even absent reasonable
suspicion of contraband.152 Albert Florence was an ideal plaintiff:
a married father of four, arrested after his wife was pulled over
for speeding in her BMW, erroneously detained on an outstanding
warrant for a fine he had already paid. Yet his Fourth Amendment claim failed. Institutional setting makes all the difference
here.
Such outcomes are common in constitutional prison law, in
large measure because of two cases: Turner v Safley153 and Sandin

147 See Ifeoma Ajunwa and Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination
against the Formerly Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 Nw L Rev 1385, 1408 (2018)
(“[L]ow-paid or unpaid prison labor has been a longstanding feature of prison life in the
United States.”); John Washington, Florida’s Prison Laborers Are Going on Strike (The
Nation, Jan 15, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/4VFF-G23P.
148 See, for example, Jason Meisner, Independent Experts Blast Quality of Medical Care
in Illinois Prisons (Chicago Tribune, May 19, 2015), online at http://www.chicagotribune
.com/news/ct-illinois-prison-medical-care-met-20150519-story.html (visited Oct 25, 2018)
(Perma archive unavailable) (describing “sweeping problems” and “poor sanitation” in
Illinois state prisons).
149 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich L Rev 505 (2001). See also William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal
Justice 6–7 (Belknap 2011); Jonathan Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on
Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 4–5 (Oxford 2007).
150 557 US 364 (2009).
151 566 US 318 (2012).
152 Note that Florence concerned pretrial custody. For a discussion of the distinctions
between pre- and post-trial confinement, see Schlanger, 103 Cornell L Rev at 364 (cited in
note 137). Although jails and prisons are governed by different liability regimes, both are
subject to a deferential, context-specific prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.
153 482 US 78, 93 (1987).
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v Conner.154 Turner established the default standard for constitutional challenges to prison policy.155 This two-step standard,
which is a prison-specific form of rational basis review, requires
courts to ask whether prisoners retain the right at issue and, if
they do, whether restriction of that right is “‘reasonably related’
to legitimate penological objectives.”156 Sandin, by contrast, set
the standard that governs prisoners’ procedural due process
claims. Under that test, which arises most frequently in cases involving solitary confinement and other forms of restrictive custody, a prisoner can state a due process claim only when a prison
policy imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”157
Although one could parse these tests in great detail, the point
for these purposes is how similar they are. Turner begins by asking
whether a constitutional right survives imprisonment; Sandin
asks whether prison policies depart from “ordinary” prison life.158
Both of these doctrines assume that prisons are exceptional
places, which ought to be judged in reference to themselves rather
than a freestanding constitutional rule. These doctrines, in other
words, presume and thereby ensure that the Constitution means
something different inside penal institutions. This conceptual
move results in a remarkably deferential body of law. I have argued elsewhere that scholars should understand the various tests
in prison law as part of a coherent, trans-substantive “penal
power doctrine” in which prison officials may infringe recognized
constitutional rights in ways that other state actors cannot.159
This judge-made doctrine emerges from and depends on a
domain-specific understanding of constitutional rights.

154

515 US 472, 500 (1995).
See Kaufman, 132 Harv L Rev at *47–48 nn 266–69 (cited in note 127) (surveying
cases in which courts have applied the Turner test).
156 Turner, 482 US at 87.
157 Sandin, 515 US at 484.
158 Id. In practice, courts have struggled to determine what “ordinary” prison life
means. When applying Sandin, some circuits compare prison practices to “general” or
statewide prison conditions, while others look to similar sites of confinement, such as other
solitary confinement units. See Elli Marcus, Comment, Toward a Standard of Meaningful
Review: Examining the Actual Protections Afforded to Prisoners in Long-Term Solitary
Confinement, 163 U Pa L Rev 1159, 1173–74 (2015) (describing the circuit split on this
issue).
159 Kaufman, 132 Harv L Rev at *5 (cited in note 127). See also Sharon Dolovich,
Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in Sharon Dolovich and Alexandra
Natapoff, eds, The New Criminal Justice Thinking 111, 112–14 (NYU 2017) (identifying
other “canons of evasion” that limit judicial oversight of prisons and jails).
155
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By focusing on prisons, then, one can see the promise and the
perils of Driver’s approach. Studying the Constitution through
the institutions it regulates is bold, honest, and generative. This
method is bold because it unmoors the Constitution from its text.
It is honest because constitutional law is actually domain driven;
it matters much more whether a plaintiff is a prisoner than
whether he sues under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.
And this approach is generative because it exposes just how much
context affects the content of constitutional rights. Prisons need
not be judged as insulated legal spaces. In Germany, for example,
external laws permeate the prison: German prisoners bear privacy rights and are subject to labor laws, including minimum
wage and paid vacation requirements.160 The idea that the prison
is an exceptional space is a product of American jurisprudence.
Emphasizing constitutional domains reveals this and forces us to
ask why prisons should look so different than the outside world.
The danger of this approach, though, is that it could aggravate pathologies in American constitutional law—in particular,
courts’ reliance on an ill-supported form of exceptionalism that
currently dominates constitutional prison and immigration law. To
return to an earlier point, domain-centered constitutional law can
be understood in one of two ways: as a descriptive claim about how
courts resolve cases involving certain institutions or as a normative
claim that constitutional rights should vary with context. The latter
claim is troubling if you study institutions, like prisons, where
courts routinely employ exceptionalism to limit constitutional
rights.161 In those contexts, one might want the Constitution to
look less domain sensitive. That is, one might want to resist the idea
that penal (or any) institutions are special in favor of a presumption that the Constitution contains principles of general and universal applicability. The fear here is that a domain-focused theory
of constitutional law could entrench a vision of the Constitution
that will be bad for the many plaintiffs who are less sympathetic

160 See James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening
Divide between America and Europe 89 (Oxford 2003) (noting that German prisoners receive paid vacation and outlining German and French prisoners’ rights); Ram Subramanian
and Alison Shames, Sentencing and Prison Practices in Germany and the Netherlands:
Implications for the United States *12 (Vera Institute of Justice, Oct 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/S9EN-N7SR (describing German prison policies).
161 To be clear, Driver does not endorse this normative theory, nor does he discuss
constitutional domains in his book. These are questions The Schoolhouse Gate raises, not
debates on which he has taken a position.
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than schoolchildren. At a more basic level, it seems highly implausible that the Constitution or the judiciary would look as good
in a book about prisons instead of schools.
That we even consider this possibility is a testament to
Driver’s contribution. Driver has written a textured, nuanced
analysis of more than a century of education doctrine and in the
process has resuscitated a lost form of legal liberalism. The
Schoolhouse Gate aims to revive our faith in federal courts and to
bring students from the footnotes to the foreground of constitutional law.162 The book achieves both goals. The only question is
whether one is possible without the other.

162 See Owen Fiss, Pillars of Justice: Lawyers and the Liberal Tradition 47 (Harvard
2017) (“[Justice Brennan] resisted, tenaciously, and yet kept the faith—why can’t we?”);
Kalman, 127 Yale L J at 1646 (cited in note 96).

